Abstract. In a simple model of the credit market, based on Stiglitz-Weiss (1981) , equilibria are computed and optimal policies to correct market failures are characterized. Some widely applied policies, notably interest-rate subsidies and investment subsidies, are compared to theoretical optimum, and an alternative optimal policy is described which we argue is more robust to model misspecification. An insight on the trade-off between credit policy and infrastructural investment is also offered. A discussion of some aspects of regional policy in Italy's Mezzogiorno is finally presented as an application of the analysis.
Introduction
Credit markets are a prototypical example of markets where the presence of asymmetric information plays an important role: would-be borrowers have superior information on the quality of their project, or on the nature of their commitment to its success; and lenders have to design contracts taking into account their lack of information on these crucial aspects. No economist ignores the seminal Stiglitz-Weiss AER '81 paper ( [22] ) on the subject and its implications for the inefficiency of market equilibrium with imperfect information. Less well known is the fact that a paper by Ordover and Weiss ( [21] ) appeared in the same journal at the same time (actually a month before), pointing out explicit forms of legal intervention which would induce improvements upon market equilibrium. Five years later, it was Mankiw ([19] ) who first showed how improvements on market outcomes could be obtained by the government through transfers, in particular investment subsidies.
Strangely enough, very few other papers ask the natural question of what kind of policy interventions may remedy the market failures typically generated by asymmetric information. One is deMeza and Webb ( [9] ), which argues that unlike in the original Stiglitz-Weiss paper, credit market equilibrium may be characterized by overinvestment, and that an investment tax can be an effective remedy. And another is * May 2003. We gratefully aknowledge MURST and FNRS for financial support.
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Innes ([15] ), which presents an in-depth analysis of a model in which banks can screen firms via variable loan size; besides a full characterization of possible equilibria, that paper also contains a discussion of various possible policy interventions.
1 Perhaps more surprisingly, there is to our knowledge no paper which studies optimal policiessomething which, albeit in a simple model, we do in the sequel.
The two most widely used policy instruments in developing countries are certainly interest-rate and investment subsidies. Roughly, the former acts in a market in which adverse selection locks the agents in an inefficient equilibrium with too high an interest rate, which low-risklow-return firms cannot afford; and it consists of the government saying to the banks, "If you charge a lower rate, I will put up the difference". In the same kind of economy, investment subsidy relies on the idea that since the problem with adverse selection from the lender's point of view is the limited liability of the borrower, lowering the amount which the lender has to finance alleviates the problem; in this case the government just offers to finance a fraction of the required investment, thus reducing the bank's burden in case of failure of the project.
In the model presented here, the interest-rate policy is unambiguously better than investment subsidy, in the sense of having higher difference between benefits and costs. And it is also optimal -i.e. it maximizes net benefits-in the class of all policies which the government can implement without using borrowers' private information.
Interest rate subsidy has however a non-negligible drawback: it forcibly distorts equilibrium prices (here the interest rate), hence it lacks robustness to model misspecification. One is thus lead to look for non-distortionary optimal policies. If firms possess enough collateralizable, albeit non-liquid, wealth, then banks can use it to achieve full efficiency. Therefore trivially, the policy which provides the necessary collateral directly is non-distortionary and attains full efficiency.
2 It is easy to guess that this is a very costly, hence suboptimal, program; but the following more sophisticated use of collateral achieves efficiency at a minimum cost. The required policy is that the government says to the firm, "If you sign an admissible contract with the bank, I will put some amount of money in a deposit account on your name; if you fail, the money goes to the bank; if you succeed it is yours" (see section (4.3) for a more precise description of the policy). Counting on that money, bank and firm can then enter their contractual relationship with no outside restrictions. The result is that the above amount can be chosen so that the resulting policy is indeed optimal -and as we argue in section (4.3), more robust than interest rate subsidy.
From a broader viewpoint, development policies may be seen as falling into the two categories of incentives to firms and provision of infrastructures, the latter including material infrastructures and human capital formation -the 'knowledge' infrastructure. Just to have an idea about figures we mention that in Europe for instance, the current share of incentives is between 25 and 50% of total public intervention in the various EU countries (table 4, columns 4 and 6, in [7] and table 3 in [5] ). The stress policy makers put on the two forms of intervention has also shifted over time; in Italy for example, with its notorious underdeveloped Mezzogiorno, the governments concentrated their efforts almost exclusively on infrastructures after World War Two, then shifted focus to incentives in the late seventies, and then changed again recently asserting that infrastructural investment is what is most needed (see Barca [2] and the last policy report on development of the italian Treasury [18] ).
We concentrate on possible government interventions on the market for start-up loans, that is in particular on the bank-firm relationship, in an asymmetric information setup. However, the model we present also yields a simple insight on the broader issue of credit policy versus infrastructural investment. The result is, simply, that if the quality of the enviroment is 'too low', then credit policy, even if optimally designed, is a waste of public money. It is of course no policy prescription, but we do find it useful to organize thoughts when confronted with different data sets that politicians may bring out to support their differing views. In particular, we have used the analysis contained in the paper to improve our understanding of some aspects of public policy in Southern Italy; the interested reader is referred to section 5.
The sequel of the paper is organized as follows. After introducing the model in the next section, we will discuss our modeling assumptions in section 2. As the reader will notice, they are largely suggested by the evidence contained in the data we have looked at (mostly concerning Europe); in the same section, some comparisons with other approaches are also considered. We next study in detail the adverse selection model (sections 3, 4 and the Appendix): we characterize market outcomes, discuss a few real world examples of credit policies and their effectiveness, and solve the problem of optimal policy design. The results are finally summarized in terms of a simple parametrization (section 4.5), which we then use to discuss the Italian case (section 5). The paper ends with a short analysis of the moral hazard version of the model (sections 6 and 7).
Model
We present a simple model based on Stiglitz-Weiss [22] . There are two possible projects, A and B; both require a monetary investment I; and both have two possible returns: project X = A, B yields x > 0 with probability p x and 0 with probability 1 − p x .
3 Project A has higher expected return than B: ap a > bp b ; but project B is better if things go well: b > a. A natural interpretation is that B saves on costs, hence it gives a higher return but with a smaller probability (of course p b < p a is implied by ap a > bp b and b > a). The better project, A has positive net value: ap a > I; for project B we shall separately consider the cases bp b ≥ I and bp b < I; in any case it will be ap b < I.
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The firm/entrepreneur has wealth W ≥ 0 insufficient to start the projects, therefore it needs outside financing; and the only possible sources of funds are a bank or the government. The latter share the same, albeit imperfect, information about the firm. If positive, firm's returns are seizable; and if wealth W is positive it can be used as collateral in a debt contract in case returns are zero; but this limits the firm's liability -no jail or other punishments in case of default. Finally, all agents will be assumed to be risk neutral.
We consider the two canonical sources of asymmetric information in credit markets, adverse selection and moral hazard, separately. In the adverse selection model, there are two types of firms (type being privately known), A and B, and firm of type X = A, B has access only to project X; the probability that a firm is of type A is denoted by λ. It is the combination of this parameter and the value of bp b − I which will be interpreted as the 'quality of the environment'.
In the moral hazard version there is just one type of firm, which has access to both projects and will choose the one which better serves its interests after a contract is signed. In each case we first study the market equilibrium, and then possible policy remedies when the latter is inefficient.
A contract between the bank and a firm, if any, is proposed by the bank. Such a contract specifies the amount advanced by the bank, fixed at I, and a pair (R, C) where R is the (total) amount the firm has to repay if the return x to its project is positive, and C is the amount of collateral, so that if x = 0 the bank will get C. Notice that we are 3 More precisely: investment is needed at date 0, returns accrue at date 1, and agents have no time preference. 4 Note that it is assumed that the capital equipment bought with funds I has zero liquidation value at date 1. This seems to best fit some 'soft' evidence that in financing contracts capital equipment bought with loan cannot be used as collateral (of course data on what is actually used as collateral are quite reserved). 5 It is assumed that W cannot be used directly as investment funds, the interpretation being that it is not liquid.
restricting the bank to offer debt contracts. The reason is that to implement a debt contracts the bank need only observe whether the firm has failed or not (in the present model, since profits are seizable, the firm will repay if it can); and this is the only observability requirement we impose. If the firm's profits were fully observable by the bank, the latter could offer a share finance contract and attain the first best in both versions of the model (see the discussion at the end of the analysis of market equilibrium).
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Before going on to the asymmetric information markets let us observe that with full information, an optimal debt contract for project X is (x, 0) if xp x ≥ I, and the null contract otherwise. This leaves the firm with zero (expected) profits, and the bank with max{xp x − I, 0}.
Modeling choices
We start by listing some relevant figures on credit markets in Italy's Mezzogiorno. We believe that similar traits characterize also other less favored regions.
Fact 1: Abundance of deposits. The loans/deposit ratio in Southern Italy is little more than half as much as in the North (see Table 1 , first column, and [1] tables A.1.5.2, A.1.5.3).
Fact 2: Financing fixed investment. In Southern Italy long-term debt is almost half of total, while it is one third in the north (see Table 1 , second column, and [1] Fact 3: Banks' market power. The spread between borrowing and lending interest rates is about 15% higher in the South than in the North for long term debt; for short term loans it is more than 50% higher (see Table 1 , third and fourth columns, and [1] 6 In this respect, the two-period restriction is not of much weight. Richer features of multiperiod models (cfr. e.g. [10] ), such as convertible debt contracts, are out of the question here, due to the minimalist observability assumption which we accept.
We have been guided by these facts in our modeling choices, as detailed below.
The meaning of 'risky'. Throughout the paper the riskier project B is a mean reducing (or preserving) spread of project A, as in the original paper by Stiglitz and Weiss. Alternatively one could take riskier to mean first order dominated (as in de Meza-Webb [9] and Innes [15] ). With only two possible outcomes, this corresponds to assuming a = b. The model would then have different properties. In particular, when W = 0, any contract R accepted by type B would be accepted by type A too. The equilibrium that we study below, in which only riskier projects are financed, would not exist. Market failure in that model, if any, would mean that limited resources are 'wasted' financing both types while a Pareto improvement could follow by focusing on type A. Given Fact 1, this type of market failure seems to us less relevant that the one generated by the exclusion of safe projects due to high interest rates.
Financing start-up capital. Most of the existing literature on credit and development (see e.g. the survey in [12] ) has focused on working capital loans in informal credit markets. A lot of attention has been devoted to peer monitoring and group lending. Here we have in mind an underdeveloped region in which a formal banking system is functioning and small-medium sized firms need capital investment to start up their business (see Fact 2).
Fixed loan size. We assumed that all firms demand a loan of identical size. If loan size were a choice variable for the firm, it could play a signaling role, as in [15] . Indeed, even when W = 0, the bank could easily separate types by proposing contracts of the form (R, I). Loan size and interest payments are often linked in real world contracts, but it is hard to argue that full separation is attained. Still, the variable loan model is useful to analyse the problem of allocating large projects to the best entrepreneurs. The fixed loan model on the other hand is more adequate to analyze credit to a pool of firms with projects of roughly similar size; for a given loan size class there may still remain a significant problem of adverse selection. For example, the case of Southern Italy seems to be well approximated by the latter model (around 75% of firms who currently receive subsidies are small; [16] ).
Monopolistic bank. In the original Stiglitz-Weiss paper, and in most of the literature following it the banking sector is modeled as being 'competitive'. On the theory side the difficulty is that there does not exist an unequivocal notion of competitive equilibrium in models with adverse selection (see Hellwig [14] ). On the interpretative side we think that for underdeveloped regions the assumption of banks' market power is a better approximation than the cut-troath Bertrand-like behavior assumed in most of the literature. The high interest rate spread, as reported in Fact 3, is a partial indicator. For additional evidence on non competitive behavior in the Italian banking system see e.g. [13] .
Observability of Profits. We restrict the bank to offer a standard debt contract. Townsend [24] and Gale and Hellwig [11] provide arguments for the optimality of debt when the bank can observe output only by paying a monitoring cost. Our model is different, because, in the adverse selection version, we also have ex-ante private information. Choe, [8] allows for ex ante private information, but in a model where projects are ranked by first order stochastic dominance so that his results are not directly applicable. As a (partial) justification of our restriction to debt contracts we mention that, when output is not observable by the bank, pure share contracts are not incentive compatible in our model (see the discussion at the end of the next section).
Risk Neutrality. What depends on this simplifying assumption is primarily the possibility of using collateral to separate firms under asymmetric information. As first noted by Bester in [3, 4] , under riskneutrality if collateralizable wealth in the hands of firms is high enough the bank can use it to achieve full separation, both in models of adverse selection or moral hazard. The riskier firm, or the firm choosing the riskier project, is more 'averse' to collateral because it will have to it give it up with higher probability than the safer firm/project; so the bank can keep the riskier firm off the safer's contract by specifying, in the latter, a high collateral requirement to balance a low interest payment. But Stiglitz and Weiss conjectured already in their 1981 paper, and then showed in 1992, see [23] , that this sorting role of collateral may disappear in a model where firms have differing degrees of risk aversion (adverse selection) and may also choose which project to run (moral hazard). More risk averse entrepreneurs will choose safer projects; so on the one hand, they are less collateral-averse because of the low probability of default; but on the other, they are more collateral-averse owing to higher risk aversion; with strong enough risk aversion the latter effect dominates, and collateral loses its role of sorting device. So, were we interested in separating equilibria with wealthy firms, we would be working with a non-robust, special case of generalized risk neutrality. But it turns out that we are not: on the one hand, the inefficient equilibria we start with are characterized by the scarcity of collateralizable wealth; and on the other hand, the only politically realistic optimal government policies will be seen to induce pooling equilibria.
Adverse Selection: Market Equilibrium
Since collateral, if applicable, is paid by type B with higher probability than by A, the bank may try to use it to separate types (by requiring collateral to type A only). If on the other hand W = 0, then a contract only specifies repayment R, and no separation is possible (of course if two different R's are offered all types will select the lower). So the cases of null and positive initial wealth are studied separately.
We introduce the notation ζ = bp b − I, the risky project's expected value. We shall also use ζ + , defined as usual as max {ζ , 0}.
Case W = 0. Here a contract is just a non-negative number R. We define firm X's profit with contract R and bank's profit on type X respectively as
As observed above, by incentive compatibility the bank will propose, if any, a single contract; and given R, firm X will accept the contract iff p x (x − R) ≥ 0, i.e. iff R ≤ x. Hence bank profits from contract R are, letting
and the bank will set R equal to a or b in any contract; of course setting R > b is equivalent to proposing no contract, and we shall use the latter terminology. Suppose first ζ ≡ bp b − I ≥ 0. The bank will set R = a if
and R = b otherwise; that is, respectively, if
7 Payoffs from a debt contact R should be written u X (R) = p x max{x − R, 0} and v(R; X) = p x min{R, x} − I, respectively. Then the firm never refuses any contract. This would deprive the model of its interest, which is to capture the fact that less risky firms drop out of the market if R is too high. To motivate the payoff we use in the text one could imagine a (linear) bankruptcy penalty. Alternatively, one might assume that in case of success, if R > x firm X can and will borrow R − x to fully meet its current obligations. This second assumption seems reasonable: borrowing will be possible because banks trust successful firms. On the other hand, to satisfactorily incorporate this intuition into a formal model one should have an infinite horizon. At this stage we prefer to interpret our payoffs as a brute force device to model the fact that firms of type X will not accept a contract with R > x.
Thus in equilibrium both types are financed if λ is high enough. If the fraction of type-A firms (the good ones) is too small they will be left out of the market, and market equilibrium is inefficient.
The analysis is similar if ζ < 0. Here setting R = b is out of the question, since on B types the bank makes losses (the right hand side of equation (2) is negative); it will then set R = a if ap λ − I ≥ 0, and refuse to propose any contract otherwise. In this case the necessary and sufficient condition for the pooling equilibrium with all firms operating is therefore
.
If contracts can only specify a repayment R, this equilibrium is (constrained) efficient when it exists. Indeed, any contract accepted by A-types will also be taken also by B-types, and for values of λ satisfying the inequality above we have (from ap λ ≥ I and b > a) that
it is better to have all firms financed than none.
We conclude that inefficient equilibrium -that is, A-types out of the market if ζ ≥ 0, and no contract if ζ < 0-occurs iff
If risky projects have non negative expected value, ζ ≥ 0, the left inequality is always satisfied. When ζ < 0 it reads λap a + (1 − λ)bp b ≥ I: a minimal value of λ is required in order that having both types operating be the efficient outcome. In both cases, if λ is not high enough, the market will be (constrained) inefficient.
Case W > 0. We assume in this case that W ≥ C A , where C A , defined below, is the equilibrium collateral required by the bank to separate types. Separation would result also for lower levels of wealth, but to be more specific on this would only complicate notation.
A contract is now a pair (R, C), with firm X's profit and bank's profits on X given respectively by
The bank can propose a pair of contract (R X , C X ), X = A, B trying to separate types. Assume first ζ ≥ 0. Consider the pair (R A , C A ) and (b, 0) with R A , C A chosen so that the constraints on A's individual rationality and B's incentive compatibility are satisfied with equality:
This system has solution; letting
Here 0 < R A < a (the first being equivalent to ap a /bp b > (1 − p a )/(1 − p b ), true because the left hand side is > 1 and the right hand side is < 1; the second easily implied by A's IR constraint a − R A = (1 − p a )C A /p a and the value of C A ); and 0 < C A < R A (the first being evident, the second easily checked to be equivalent to ap a > bp b which is true).
With this pair of contracts the bank separates types; and it is easy to check that the other IR and IC constraints are met. On the contract signed with A the bank makes
and on B's contract it makes v(b, 0; B) = bp b − I. These are exactly the full information profits. If ζ < 0, then the bank can propose just one contract, (R A , C A ); only A will apply (we are assuming that in case of indifference the firm does 'what we want'; the contract can be modified so that incentives are strict), and the bank makes the same profits as before on type A, and nothing on type B. Again, the bank extracts all the gains from trade as if it had perfect information.
Therefore if W is high enough it works as a sorting device, and whatever the values of λ and ζ the equilibrium outcome is efficient. Thanks to risk neutrality, the bank is able to separate the two types of firms without leaving any rent: contract (R A , C A ) is on the individual rationality line of both types.
Share finance. If the bank can observe x, the realization of the firm's return, it can finance the firm with a mix of debt and share finance. Then the equilibrium will be efficient even in the absence of collateral. Assume W = 0 and let a contract be (α, R), where α is the fraction of the investment financed with debt. A fraction (1 − α) of the investment I is financed with a share contract, giving to the bank a right on a fraction (1 − α) of the firms (post-debt) returns in case of success. Payoffs are:
If ζ ≥ 0, i.e. both types of projects have positive expected value, the bank can offer two contracts, (α A , R A ) = (0, 0) and (α B , R B ) = (1, b). Incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints for the firms are satisfied, and the first best is achieved. If ζ < 0, again the first best can be achieved, this time by offering only the 'pure share finance' contract (0, 0), taken only by the A-type firms. On the other hand, if x is not observed by the bank, the B type can always claim that x = a, and pay to the bank (1 − α)(a − R). This destroys the incentive compatibility of the share finance contracts above.
Adverse Selection: Policy
If firms have enough initial wealth, market equilibrium is efficient; so assume W = 0. Then there is scope for policy only if condition (3) on page 9 holds; so assume it does. Starting from an inefficient market equilibrium, the aim of policy is to act on agents' incentives so as to induce a more efficient outcome. Improvements come at a cost, and the Government objective is to maximize net gains. Let us see what is involved before going to the details. If ζ ≥ 0, the inefficient market equilibrium has only B-types investing; since these projects have positive net worth, the problem is simply to have also A-types operating their projects, via a policy with minimal cost. If ζ < 0 on the other hand, inefficient market equilibrium has no firm financed; in this case 'full' efficiency would be with only A-types operating; but this might be very costly to achieve, and it may happen that a policy inducing all firms to operate -a less efficient outcome-yelds higher net benefits (think of ζ < 0 but small). The general problem is to consider both policies that induces pooling and policies that induce separation, and to compare their net gains. Before doing so, we discuss the two well know policy interventions mentioned in the introduction, namely interest rate and investment subsidies. We also introduce our policy proposal, 'money in a savings account', and discuss its merits. These three policies induce pooling equilibria, and generate the same expected gains with respect to the pre-policy equilibrium, G = λ(ap a − I) + (1 − λ) min{bp b − I, 0}; we compare their costs.
4.1.
Interest Rate Subsidy. This policy consists of Government (henceforth Gov) saying to the bank: "If you charge R ≤ a, I shall augment it to (1 + β)R". Thus bank's profits in equation (1) page 8 become
Bank's pre-policy profits are (1 − λ)ζ + . Gov chooses the least β such that the bank prefers to finance all firms in the resulting equilibrium; therefore Gov chooses β such that
i.e.
The (expected) cost of this policy is p λ β * a = I −ap λ +(1−λ)ζ + ≡ t * .
Investment Subsidy.
Here Gov co-finances directly a share (1− θ) of the cost of any project, so that firms must only raise θI on the market. As before, the optimal level of θ will be chosen by Gov so that at equilibrium all projects are financed. The bank's profits for given θ are:
As we start from an inefficient equilibrium, with θ = 1 either no project or only risky projects are financed. Gov induces financing of all firms by setting:
which is bigger than zero if λ >
. Comparing with equation (3), we see that there is an interval of values of λ for which θ > 0 is enough to achieve efficiency. The cost of this policy is (1 − θ * )I =
, which is always bigger then t * . This is evident for ζ ≥ 0; when ζ < 0 it follows from the condition that λ >
Money in a savings account. In our analysis of market equilibrium we saw that collateral may play an important role in facilitating the separation of firms' types. This suggests that Gov may try to solve the market failure by providing collateral. Indeed, if Gov gives to all firms a gift C A , as defined in equation (4) on page 10, the bank can use this collateral to separate firms, and efficiency is achieved. The cost of this policy is high:
, always bigger than t * (t * = I − ap λ + (1 − λ)ζ + is decreasing in λ, and takes value p b (b − a) < C A when λ = 0). We propose a better way to use public funds, whereby instead of the above wasteful separation, Gov provides collateral in a way that induces pooling as the optimal choice of the bank. Under this policy, which we call 'money in a savings account' Gov says to firm: "If you sign contract a (R, C) with R − C ≤ a, I will put min{C, C} into a savings account, which the bank can use as collateral; if your project succeeds, that money is yours". Thus the money goes to firm with probability p x and to bank with probability (1 − p x ). We first compute equilibrium given C, then evaluate the C-optimal policy, starting as always with an inefficient pre-policy equilibrium.
Equilibrium given C. The firm may again choose a pair of contracts (R X , C X ) for X = A, B. We let
If firm X signs contract (R X , C X ), bank's profit on the contract is
The incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints are
Now, easily, the IC constraints imply R
A −C A = R B −C B .
If the bank proposes contracts with R
A − C A = R B − C B ≤ a, both individual rationality constraints are satisfied. Given C, bank's profits on X are then
Resulting profits for the bank are therefore
Alternatively, if R A − C A = R B − C B > a, both C A and C B will be zero. We are back in the no-policy situation, and the banks optimal choices and profits are those of the market equilibrium.
Policy: Choice of C. We consider inefficient market equilibrium in the two cases (i) ζ ≥ 0 and (ii) ζ < 0.
(i) Case ζ ≥ 0; here inefficiency results iff ap λ − I < (1 − λ)ζ, with R = b and A-types out of the market in equilibrium. Gov's objective is to bring A-types in; since given C bank's profits from pooling are those in (8) above, this is achieved by setting C so that profits in (8) at least as high as pre-policy profits (1 − λ)(bp b − I) ≥ 0; that is, Gov will set C * = (1 − λ)(bp b − I) − (ap λ − I).
(ii) Case ζ < 0; in this case the inefficiency condition is ap λ − I < 0: no contract is offered in equilibrium. Even in the presence of the policy, the bank can never separate the low risk firms. The minimal level of C to induce the bank to finance all firms is in this case C * = I − ap λ .
We conclude that the cost of this policy is
identical to that of the interest subsidy policy.
We end this section with some more general comments on pooling policies. Consider the policy whereby Gov guarantees a transfer C directly to the bank, conditional it offering 'cheap credit', R ≤ a. Firm's payoff are unaffected, and bank's payoff becomes:
The minimal value of C that, starting from inefficiency, induces the bank to set R = a and finance all firms is C * =
. Again the expected cost of the policy is equal to t * . As we saw, under the 'money in the savings account' policy the subsidy ends up in the banks' hands; one could then argue that the direct transfer is a simpler way to obtain the same result. Indeed, as shown in the appendix, this is how all optimal pooling policies works: compensate the bank if it accepts to reduce the interest rate and serve more clients 8 . Notice though that alternative optimal pooling policies are not equivalent in terms of implementation. Interest rate subsidy and collateral to bank require Gov to monitor market prices, while 'money in a savings account' is implemented by asking the firms which obtain an admissible contract to apply for the subsidy.
A reinterpretation of the model in terms of standard monopoly theory may be useful. Our bank is a monopoly which, in the absence of collateral, cannot price discriminate. At the inefficient equilibrium, the bank produces a suboptimal quantity. Policies like an interest rate subsidy, or the collateral to the bank just discussed, amount to a price subsidy that induces the bank produce the optimal quantity, compensating it for the loss of surplus on the units it was already selling. As in the standard theory, this intervention brings efficiency. Another possibility is to offer a quantity subsidy on additional units that the firm may sell. To sell more the firm will have to reduce the price, and again the subsidy must be big enough so as to compensate the firm for the losses. This is how the 'money in a savings account' policy works, with the additional twist that the demand for the subsidy will be introduced by the rationed consumers' (the firms), and transferred to the bank thanks to its contract setting power. We argue that this second type of intervention is more robust. For example, suppose that the true value of λ is high enough and market equilibrium is efficient, but Gov, on the basis of a wrong estimate of the proportion of good projects, thinks that an intervention is necessary. Policies which condition a transfer to the bank on the level of interest rate will translate into a wasteful transfer to the bank. Our policy, if announced, will remain idle and not alter the equilibrium. Indeed, at the efficient equilibrium all firms obtain the contract (a, 0), and they have no interest in applying for the subsidy only to be offered an equivalent (for them) contract (a + C * , C * ) 9 .
4.4. Optimal Policies. We have discussed some forms of pooling policies, and compared their costs. To investigate whether there are even less expensive ways to induce pooling, and under what condition pooling policies may be dominated by separating ones, we now address the problem of optimal policy design. The first step is to define the class of policies which are compatible with the observability restrictions embodied in the model. A policy of Gov is a set of monetary transfers at dates 0 and 1, conditional on observables. The latter are:
• at date 0, actions:
2 ∪ {∅}, where accepting ∅ means signing no contract;
• at date 1, success/failure of the project. This we denote by s: s = 1 [resp. 0] will mean success [resp. failure]. The maintained assumptions are the following:
(1) Gov's policy is public knowledge; (2) Transfers between Gov and agent i (where i is bank or firm) cannot be conditional on agent j = i 's actions; (3) Agents may reject transfers proposed by Gov (so i must be better off accepting the transfer, given contract between Gov and j = i). Observe that Assumption (3) implies for example that if Gov gives money to be used as collateral to all firms at date 0, it cannot ask the bank to give up its date-1 profits: we want to study incentive policies, participation to which is typically voluntary. Similarly, Assumption (2) implies that Gov cannot propose a transfer to firms conditional upon bank accepting a tax.
We shall use the following labels: F for firm, K for bank. A policy is then a pair of transfers (t K , t F ):
Here t K,0 ((·), (·)) is the transfer to the bank if that contract is proposed; t F,0 (R, C) is the transfer to the firm if (R, C) is accepted, etc.
The optimal policy problem is posed as follows. Before the intervention, the economy is at an inefficient equilibrium. Gov announces an incentive policy, (t K , t F ). Given the announced policy, the bank may propose new contracts that the firm accepts or refuse. Consistently with our assumption that all contractual power is with the bank, a refusal by the firm does not bring back the pre-policy contract: if the firm refuses the bank's proposal, both obtain their reservation utility.
Policy analysis consists of two parts: in the first we compute the minimal cost to induce a pooling equilibrium, in the second that of obtaining a separating equilibrium; comparing the net gains, the optimal policy is obtained for the various parameter configurations. The results of the analysis, reported in the Appendix, are summarized here. Proposition 1. The cost of an optimal pooling policy is t * = I − ap λ + (1 − λ)ζ + .
Proposition 2. When ζ ≥ 0, the cost of an optimal separating policy is the same as the cost of an optimal pooling policy, t * .
Starting from the inefficient equilibrium, a pooling policy creates total additional gains λ(ap a − I) + (1 − λ) min{bp b − I, 0}, while a separating policy creates additional gains λ(ap a − I). Thus optimal separation and pooling policies are equivalent for Gov when ζ ≥ 0. Nevertheless, the required policies are quite different. Indeed, as we show in the Appendix, any optimal separating policy requires Gov to pay B-types outright to keep them away from the contract designed for A-types. For example, in the 'gift' policy discussed above, the B types receive
from Gov, even if no collateral is required to them. This may be practically problematic to implement.
As for the other policies discussed above, notice that interest rate subsidies and 'money in a savings account' are both optimal pooling policies. In terms of our notation, the interest rate subsidy policy is to set t K (R, C) = p λ β * a = t * if R ≤ a, and zero otherwise. The 'money in a savings account ' policy is to set t F,1 (R, C, s) = χ[R − C ≤ a]min{t * , C}, s = 0, 1.
When ζ < 0, the cost of an optimal pooling policy is as in Proposition 1, while for separating policies we have Proposition 3. When ζ < 0, the cost of an optimal separating policy is
The comparison between separating and pooling policies must now take into account that with separation the gains are larger than in the pooling case ('lemons' are kept out of the market). The net gains of an optimal pooling policy are bigger than those of an optimal separating policy if
which, after rearrangement, becomes
Here: if bp b ∼ I, then ">" holds in the above relation, and optimal policy is to induce pooling; if bp b is low enough on the other hand, "<" holds and it is optimal to induce separation.
4.5. Synthesis. We summarize our findings. Fix a, b, p a , I with a < b, ap a > I. We can then parametrize economies by the riskiness of the 'risky' projects,
], and the proportion of 'safe' projects in the pool of firms, λ. A crucial threshold is whether p b is above or below I/b; in the latter case the pool of firms contains 'lemons', projects that have a negative expected value.
For an optimal pooling policy, benefits will be larger than costs if the probability of A is not too low
Write (3) p.9 as λ 1 ≤ λ < λ 3 , and (10) as λ ≥ λ 2 ; then it is elementarily checked that for any value of p b one has λ 1 < λ 2 < λ 3 . For λ 1 ≤ λ < λ 2 , market equilibrium is inefficient but using credit policy to force a pooling outcome is wasteful. In these situations the real problem is not to foster investment but to improve the average quality of projects (i.e. to raise λ and/or p b through public investment). For λ 2 ≤ λ < λ 3 on the other hand, a pooling policy is an effective remedy to market failure. The bounds λ i , i = 1, 2, 3 are functions of p b , and the interval of values of λ for which a pooling policy is effective shrinks as p b gets close to zero. In particular, the situation can be summarized as in figure 1 .
If p b = ap a /b, the risky projects are mean preserving spread of the safer ones, and all projects generate positive expected return (the case considered in the Stiglitz-Weiss paper). For this parameter configuration, λ 1 = 0, financing all projects is always worthwhile, and for intermediate values of λ the optimal pooling policies discussed above generate higher benefits than costs.
When p b is lower than ap a /b, risky projects are mean reducing spreads, but they still have positive expected returns as long as p b ≥ I/b. The analysis does not change much qualitatively: for intermediate values of λ, inducing pooling is effective.
On the other hand, when p b < I/b -the 'lemon case'-the picture changes. Now λ 1 is positive: low values of λ make the 'no-contract' situation a better alternative than the pooling equilibrium. Indeed, the region of values of λ for which the pooling policy is effective shrinks to zero, as p b gets lower. In this region of parameters -low p b , low λ-the net gains of an optimal separation policy may still be positive. The relevant inequality is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 1 . The general picture. Below λ 1 and above λ 3 market equilibrium is (constrained) efficient; in the shaded area, between λ 2 and λ 3 , optimal pooling policies are desirable; between λ 1 and λ 2 , they are wasteful, in that costs outweigh benefits.
Thus, in 'very low quality environments', separating policies may still be effective, even if, as we discussed, difficult to implement.
The case of Italy
The analysis presented here has helped us understanding some aspects of italian development policy, and about this we now report.
The problem of closing the gap between industrialized North and mainly agricultural South (Mezzogiorno) has been on the agenda of all Italy's governments since the late eighteenth century. Shortly after World War Two, the newly appointed republican government promoted a massive, enduring 'extraordinary intervention' to this effect. 10 The priority was set on basic infrastructure, and we obviously need no model to understand that the choice was motivated by the (extremely) poor quality of the environment.
In the late seventies the focus shifted to incentives to individual projects (DPR 218/1978), in particular subsidized credit (art. 63; here, section 4.1) and investment subsidies (art. 69; section 4.2 above). The selection criteria in DPR 218/1978 were loose, reducing to a generic appeal to check the "validity of the projects, from the financial, economic and technical viewpoint" (art. 71); and they were drastically tightened in early nineties by Law 488/1992, which thus enabled incentive policies to be directed to a better pool of firms.
11
In terms of our model, we can represent the effect of the better selection procedure by identifying the 'pre-488' situation with an economy in which the relevant pool of firms contains 'lemons', i.e. p b < I/b (i.e. ζ < 0), and the 'post-488' situation with an economy in which p b ≥ I/b (ζ ≥ 0).
As we saw above, an investment subsidy like the one stipulated in DPR 218/1978 and Law 488/92 (section 4.2) induces a pooling equilibrium. For economies with ζ < 0 this means financing lemons along with good projects. The extremely high default rate among the firms which benefited from aid according to DPR 218 (and the ensuing Law 64/1986) makes a case for a low λ; and from this (together with ζ < 0) we may conclude that likely, the costs of policy outweighted its benefits at the time (in terms of figure 1, refer to the area close to the origin).
Recently, documents of the italian government point to another swing in policy, again towards infrastructural investment (see the last Treasury report [18] and, for background, Barca [2] ). We know that even with ζ ≥ 0 (the post-488 situation), pooling policy is effective if and only if λ is not too low. The current shift would then be justified if λ is indeed low. Of course reality is much more complex than our model -too much for us to reach a definite conclusion. With the help of the model however a rough picture of a segmented credit market emerges from the following facts: on the one hand, there are highly collateralized loans (cfr. footnote 2) to relatively 'wealthy' firms, out of the scope of policy; on the other, there is a subsidized pool of firms with a relatively high default rate (20% against a 6% in the north, [1] tables A.1.5.5 and A.1.5.6) and little wealth (80% of defaults come from uncollateralized loans, ib. A.3.5.6). This does seem to point to a low lambda in the pool. 12 
Moral Hazard: Market Equilibrium
In this version of the model there is a firm who has access to the two projects A and B; and firm's choice of project is non-contractible. The bank proposes as before debt contracts of the form (R, C), with loan 11 Cfr. [6] , [16] and [17] on Law 488/92 and its effects. For insiders: when identifying Law 488 with the policy in section 4.2, we are modelling residual uncertainty among projects of comparable size, after the 488 'auction'. 12 We can stretch our model to discuss the following lock-in effect, pointed out to us by Fabrizio Barca. Banks base their decisions on their perception of the quality of applicants, in turn based on past history. Even if the average quality is improving, the bank's perception depends on observed outcomes of financed firms, which, according to our model, are the riskier ones. An interesting policy problem is then how to raise banks' perception of the quality of environment. Public investment in infrastructure might act as a signal to this effect. size fixed at I. Efficiency here is to undertake project A, just because ap a > bp b .
Unavoidably, the following analysis will break into several subcases, depending on parameters' configurations, and it will be tedious to follow. The intuition is however quite simple: if firm's initial wealth W is high enough, by requiring it as collateral the bank will find it more profitable to have the firm select project A rather than to induce the inefficient action B; how much is 'high enough' depends on parameters' values (it can be as low as zero). However, if W is not 'very' high, the bank cannot extract all profits from the firm, and as a consequence in some parameter region the bank will find it optimal to propose no contract. To ease exposition we shall exclude the latter possibility, by assuming
whereR is defined in equation (14) below. 13 This will guarantee that whenever A is the better project from the point of view of the bank, then the optimal contract to induce it will ensure non-negative profits to the bank. As a consequence, there will be no no-contract equilibrium. Again the case of no initial wealth is studied first.
Case W = 0. Here necessarily C = 0, thus a contract is an R ≥ 0. If project X = A, B is chosen, the firm's and the bank's profits under contract R are respectively u(X, R) = p x (x − R), and
Given these payoffs it is clear that the full information equilibrium (where bank may offer an X-conditional contract) is the efficient one, with R = a. Consider free post-contractual choice of project. The
and for these values of R the firm's payoff under
Thus, the firm will choose X = A iff R ≤R, B ifR < R ≤ b, and will refuse to operate for larger R. From this, bank's profits are
and from this in turn, bank will induce project A if p aR − I ≥ bp b − I (with contract R =R), and B otherwise (via R = b). Thus, equilibrium is inefficient iff bp b − p aR > 0. Notice that in the efficient region (in (I, a, b, p a p b ) -parameter space) the firm makes positive profits (forR < a); in the inefficient set firm's profits are zero.
Case W > 0. Here a contract is a pair (R, C), with C ≤ W . Firm's profits from project X = A, B under contract (R, C), and bank's profits from the contract if firm chooses X, are respectively
To derive bank's optimal contract and compute market equilibrium, observe that the firm prefers to select project A rather than B iff p a (a− R)
so it will select project A if the above inequality holds, provided its individual rationality constraint is satisfied; and it will select B if R > R + C, provided again it makes no losses by so doing. Hence bank's profits from contract (R, C) are
Note that bank's profits are increasing in both R and C; thus to induce project A it will set R =R + C and C as high as it can with such R, that is, taking also the constraint C ≤ W into account, C = min{W, p a (a −R)} -the resulting payoff being p aR + min{W, p a (a − R)} − I. For project B, analogously, it will set R = b −
; for such R its payoff becomes just bp b − I, independent of C; thus bank may set R = b and C = 0 in this case -collateral has no role to induce project B. Thus, market equilibrium will be inefficient (with the firm selecting project B) iff p aR + min{W, p a (a −R)} < bp b , or min{W, p a (a −R)} < bp b − p aR .
Note that this subsumes the case W = 0. From this it is now easy to summarize equilibrium efficiency properties in parameter space. The left hand size of the inequality above is non-negative; hence if bp b − p aR ≤ 0, equilibrium is efficient. Suppose bp b − p aR > 0; if W < bp b − p aR , then the inequality displayed above holds (recall that bp b < ap a ), and equilibrium is inefficient. If W ≥ bp b − p aR then the inequality in question does not hold (easily seen by considering separately the cases bp b − p aR ≤ W ≤ p a (a −R) and W > p a (a −R)), and equilibrium is efficient again.
In conclusion market equilibrium is inefficient (with project B selectd in equilibrium) iff
It is interesting to look at equilibrium payoffs. In the inefficient region firm's profits are zero (R = b, C = 0). In the efficient region, given the equilibrium contract found above (R =R + C and C = min{W, p a (a −R)}) one finds that: if W < p a (a −R), then bank's payoff is p aR + W − I > 0 (for W ≥ bp b − p aR > ap a − p aR ≥ 0, the last by assumption (12)), but also firm's payoff is W + p a (a −R) − C = p a (a −R) > W ; while if W ≥ p a (a −R), bank's profit is ap a − I > 0, and firm's payoff is W + p a (a −R) − C = W : collateral enables the bank to extract all surplus iff W is high enough.
Share finance. As in the case of adverse selection, if the bank can observe the realization of the firm's return and offer a venture capital contract, efficiency is achieved at equilibrium. Assume W = 0, and let (α, R) be the proposed contract, where α is the fraction of the investment financed with debt. Payoffs are like in (3): u(X, α, R) = p x α(x − R), and
The choice of the firm is not influenced by the value of α: as long as α is positive the firm will choose project A iff R ≤R. By proposing a contract (α,R) with α small enough the bank can always make more profit than if it sets R = b (α is irrelevant in this case). With no restriction on α the bank will set α = 0, i.e. buy the firm, and choose action A. If the bank does not observe x, incentive compatibility becomes binding even with share finance: for any given value of α, the firm can choose B, declare x = a, and end up with profits p b (b − (1 − α)(a − R)).
Moral Hazard: Policy
In the moral hazard version of the model efficiency means 'choosing A'. As before, we assume that the realized returns cannot be observed if the firm does not declare bankruptcy. If firms have enough initial wealth the market equilibrium is efficient; so assume W = 0. In this case, equilibrium is inefficient iff bp b >Rp a (notice that this, via (12) , implies bp b > I). Starting from the inefficient equilibrium, a policy that induces a switch from B to A generates gains G = ap a − bp b . We do not pursue a complete analysis of optimal policies for the moral hazard case, because there is no single important parameter such as the λ of the adverse selection model, and any conclusion would depend in complicated ways upon a, b, p a ad p b . We limit our discussion to the two most interesting policies identified above, namely the interest rate subsidy (cfr. 4.1 ) and the grant (cfr. 4.3).
7.1. Interest Rate Subsidy. Under moral hazard, the policy takes the following form: "If you charge R ≤R, I shall augment it to (1 + β)R". Bank's profits are
Gov chooses the least β such that the bank prefers to induce firms to choose A in the resulting equilibrium:
and the cost of this policy is p a βR = bp b −Rp a .
Grants to Firms.
As in the case of adverse selection, one possible policy is that Gov makes a 'gift' to all firms. From equation (15) , the optimal size of the gift isĈ = bp b −Rp a . Then at equilibrium the bank will chose a contract (R +Ĉ,Ĉ), induce the firm to choose A and make the same profits as in the inefficient equilibrium, bp b − I. The cost of this policy isĈ = bp b −Rp a , identical to that of the interest subsidy identified above. One may consider a policy similar to the one discussed in section 4.3: "If you sign contract (R, C) with R ≤ R, I put min{C, C} into a 'savings account', which the bank can use as collateral; if your project succeeds, that money is yours". Gov chooses R and C so that at equilibrium the bank prefers to induce the choice of A. In this case the collateral is provided by Gov only if the bank accepts to give 'cheap credit'. Notice though that, to obtain efficiency, the collateral must be high enough so that in equilibrium the bank prefers to induce A instead of setting R = b and renounce to the collateral. Gov must set C = bp b −Rp a and R =R + C, so that this policy is equivalent to the simple unconditional grant.
As in the adverse selection model, the conclusion is that interest subsidies and grants are equivalent means to achieve efficiency. Gains outweights costs if ap a −bp b > bp b −Rp a , a condition which is verified for p b sufficiently low. Combining this condition with that for inefficiency, bp b −Rp a > 0, we can identify the set of parameters for which policy is effective.
A policy is a pair of transfers (t K , t F ):
where t K,0 ((·), (·)) is the transfer to the bank if that contract is proposed; t F,0 (R, C) is the transfer to the firm if (R, C) is accepted, etc.
Inducing a pooling equilibrium. Here Gov forces the bank to offer a single contract, and the bank will chose a contract (R, C) so as to satisfy the participation constraints of both types. We can therefore simplify our notation:
where ∧ is 'min' -t 0 + t 1 (0) is disposable income in s = 0.
Given the announced policy, (R, C) must be a best pooling contract for the bank, i.e. it must maximize the bank's profits subject to the individual rationality constraints; that is, it must solve max R,C p λ (R + t K0 (R, C) + t K1 (R, C, 1))
These IR X constraints may be written as
X , x = a, b; also, the bank controls C (via C) up to t 0 + t 1 (0). The above problem may then be written as . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 2 . Inducing a pooling equilibrium
The geometry of the constraints is illustrated in figure 2 . The intersection of the two IR constraints if both binding is (easily computed to be)
So C * > t 0 + t 1 (0), and therefore the induced equilibrium must be with IR A binding. Indeed, suppose a policy induces an equilibrium like point (R , C ) in figure 2 part (b); then Gov could induce a point like (R , C ) at lower cost (lower t K , all other transfers unchanged) while stil having all firms' rationality constraints satisfied. Hence, from IR
Notice that the above equation, together with C ≤ t 0 + t 1 (0), implies that R ≥ a + t 0 + t 1 (1). Substituting and rearranging, bank's profits become
And given that R ≥ a + t 0 + t 1 (1), an argument similar to the one justifying IR A binding shows that the equilibrium induced by an optimal policy must have R = a + t 0 + t 1 (1). On the other hand, bank's profits must be not les than pre-policy profits, which are (1 − λ)(bp b − I) + = (1 − λ)ζ + . Hence the cost of policy, t K + t F λ , is bounded below:
This lower bound can be attained easily. For example, Gov may set t F λ = 0 and t K (R, C) = t * if R ≤ a and zero otherwise (which means saying to the bank, "If you charge R ≤ a I will cover your losses"). We thus have Proposition 1. The cost of an optimal pooling policy is t * = I − ap λ + (1 − λ)ζ + .
Inducing a separating equilibrium. Once more, we split analysis for the cases ζ ≥ 0 and ζ < 0.
Case ζ ≥ 0. We assume for now that (R B , C B ) = (b, 0). The idea is that since type B dislikes collateral more than type A (he has to pay it with a higher probability), the easiest way to keep him off A's contract is to let him away with no collateral (the IC B becomes harder to meet if C B goes up). We verify later that it is actually more costly for Gov to reach any equilibrium with (R B , C B ) = (b, 0). We then let (R, C) = (R A , C A ). Also, we use
and t 0 , t 1 (s) and C will be as before. The transfer from Gov to the bank is now t On the other hand, firm X's payoff from (R, C) is p x (x + t 0 + t 1 (1) − R) + (1 − p x )(t 0 + t 1 (0) − C). Therefore A's individual rationality and B's incentive compatibility constraints are respectively p a (a + t 0 + t 1 (1) − R) + (1 − p a )(t 0 + t 1 (0) − C) ≥ 0
which may be written as p a R + (1 − p a )C ≤ t 0 + p a (a + t 1 (1)) + (1 − p a )t 1 (0)
Geometrically, the constraints are illustrated in figure 3. Bank's profits are t K (·) + (1 − λ)(bp b − I) + λ p a R + (1 − p a )C − I , and as before the bank controls C (via C) up to t 0 + t 1 (0). Viewing the bank's problem as one in (R, C) with the additional constraint C ≤ t 0 + t 1 (0), it is clear that it must be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Figure 3 . Inducing a separating equilibrium with C * as in figure 3 , otherwise the bank's problem has empty feasible set. The intersection point drawn in the figure is
So (18) is simply t B ≥ p b (b − a); therefore Gov will set t B = p b (b − a), (18) will hold with equality, and in equilibrium (R, C) = (R * , C * ), i.e. Here Gov says to firms: "If you sign contract (b, 0) you get t B ; if you sign any other contract you pay −t 1 (1) in case of success". We may thus state Proposition 2. When ζ ≥ 0, the cost of an optimal separating policy is the same as the cost of an optimal pooling policy, t * .
Before we turn to the case ζ < 0 we should confirm that the assumption that (R B , C B ) = (b, 0) was without loss of generality. Indeed, for the bank to improve upon (b, 0) it must be (with self-evident undefined notation)
The incentive compatibility constraint for B becomes The other constraints being unaffected, we conclude that implementing a separating equilibrium via a (R B , C B ) = (b, 0) is always (weakly) more costly for Gov than with (b, 0).
Case ζ < 0. In this case an efficient separating equilibrium has only A-types financed; B should sign no contract. Notation is as before, except that now t B = t F,0 (∅), and without loss of generality we are taking t F,1 (∅, s) = 0. Bank's profits on A are t K (·) + p a R + (1 − p a )C − I; and given t B ≥ 0, the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints are now p a (a + t 0 + t 1 (1) − R) + (1 − p a )(t 0 + t 1 (0) − C) ≥ t The geometry of the problem is as in the previous case, and the last picture still applies as is. As before the bank chooses C subject to C ≤ t 0 + t 1 (0), and again (18) must hold. In the present case the intersection (C * , R * ) is (with η as on page 25) C * = t 0 + t 1 (0) + η − t B , R * = a + t 0 + t 1 (1) − η p a .
